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HOW NOT TO CHARACTERIZE A HARD
CHOICE
Kevin Reuter and Michael Messerli
People are often faced with so called hard choices – also known as hard cases
of comparison. In trying to characterize these hard choices, philosophers have
made two central claims. First, failure of transitivity underlies hard cases of
comparison. Second, using a random procedure is considered inappropriate in
order to arrive at a decision in hard cases. While having some argumentative
support, both claims primarily rely on expert intuitions. The results of the
experiments we present in this paper challenge both claims, as well as the
representativeness of expert intuitions that support these claims, by showing
that most people (i) violate transitivity only if a hard choice is important,
and (ii) ﬁnd it appropriate to use a random procedure even in hard cases of
comparison.
Keywords: Hard Cases; Small-Improvement Argument; Failure of Transitivi-
ty; Importance of Decisions; Random Choice; Rationality; Empirical Studies.
1 Introduction
Your favorite band is in town performing their best hits in a local club to-
night. But it is also the last day of the season in which your home team
plays against its main contender for the league title. Both events happen
at the same time and you have tickets for both of them. Obviously, you
cannot attend both events. Making a decision in such a situation is tough
because one option seems to be neither better, nor worse compared to the
other, even when a small incentive like a 5% discount is added to one of the
two options. These so-called hard cases of comparisons have attracted a lot of
attention among philosophers for they pose particularly fascinating problems
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for questions of comparability and rationality.1
However, before we can tackle these problems, it is crucial that an accu-
rate description of hard choices is provided which is empirically adequate, i.e.
that the features we use to characterize hard choices indeed single out these
but not ﬁctitious cases. This essay empirically investigates two particularly
central claims, thereby raising serious doubts about each of them.
First, philosophers have claimed that in hard cases of comparison, people
reject the application of a random procedure to arrive at a decision, i.e.
it would be considered inappropriate to toss a coin in order to determine
whether one should go to the concert or to the sports event. In contrast,
when two options are perceived to be equally good, e.g. a choice between two
cookies of the same type, people will ﬁnd it appropriate to choose one option
based on a random procedure. Importantly, we need to clearly distinguish the
descriptive from the normative claim about using a random process. Whereas
Schaber2 has argued that we do ﬁnd it inappropriate to toss a coin in hard
cases, Chang3 holds that it is inappropriate and thus that we should not toss
in coin in such cases. In contrast, when people are faced with a choice in
which both options are considered equally good, no such restrictions on the
decision-making process are put forward by Schaber and Chang. Section 3
examines whether people think it inappropriate to toss a coin in hard cases,
and how the results bear on both the descriptive and normative claims made
in the literature.
The second claim that we are going to investigate states that hard cases
of comparison manifest a failure of transitive reasoning.4 In order to see why
the violation of transitivity has received a lot of attention in debates on hard
choices, let us consider the small-improvement argument, hereafter SIA: If a
person asserts:
1 See Martijn Boot, ’Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justiﬁed Choice’, Philosophi-
cal Studies 146 (2009), pp. 75-92. Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112
(2002), pp. 659-688. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986).
2 See Peter Schaber, ’Sind alle Werte vergleichbar? Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse und das In-
kommensurabilitätsproblem’, Analyse und Kritik 16 (1994), pp. 153-165, at p. 158.
3 Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112 (2002), at p. 684-685. Ruth Chang,
’Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’ Philosophical Issues 22 (2012), pp. 106-
126, at p. 118.
4 See e.g. Martijn Boot, ’Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justiﬁed Choice’, Phi-
losophical Studies 146 (2009) and Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112
(2002).
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(1) x is neither better nor worse than y; E.g., a career as a lawyer
is neither better nor worse than a career as an artist.
and:
(2) x+ is neither better nor worse than y; E.g., a career as a
lawyer plus two additional holidays is neither better nor worse
than a career as an artist.
and:
(3) x+ is better than x; E.g., a career as a lawyer plus two addi-
tional holidays is better than a career as a lawyer.
then we can logically conclude that x is neither better than, nor worse
than, nor equally good to y.5 Whether or not the conclusion of the small-
improvent argument means that options in hard cases are incomparable6 on
par7 or roughly comparable8 is an interesting question that is beyond the
5 It is usually claimed in philosophical debates that additional premises, such as tran-
sitivity, are necessary to arrive at this conclusion (e.g. Nicolas Espinoza, ’The Small
Improvement Argument’, Synthese 165 (2008), pp. 127-139, at p. 130. Johan Gustafs-
son & Nicolas Espinoza, ’Conﬂicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument’,
The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), pp. 754-763, at p. 755). However, the rules of
ﬁrst-order logic suﬃce to show that ¬ (x=y):
1 ¬(x+ ≻ y) premise 2 of the SIA
2 x+ ≻ x premise 3 of the SIA
3 x = y assumption
4 x+ ≻ y 2,3
5 x+ ≻ y ∧ ¬(x+ ≻ y) 1,4 ∧I
C [∴] ¬(x = y) 3,5 reductio
Assuming that x and y are equally good, we derived a contradiction – substituting x
and y in premise (2). This leads to a reductio of assumption (3). The negation must be
true, i.e. x and y are not equally good. Note that this reductio argument is conditional
on premise 1 and 2. Thus, if premise 1 and 2 are correct - which people usually assume
in this context - then it logically follows that x and y are not equally good.
6 Raz, The Morality of Freedom
7 Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112 (2002)
8 Derek Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
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scope of this paper. However, while the question of the proper interpretation
of the SIA has been hotly contested, most philosophers agree that the three
premises of the SIA additionally reveal a failure of transitivity. If people were
to reason transitively, then (x+) should not be considered better than (x)
when they also agree to (1) and (2) (see the next section for a formal ana-
lysis). Thus, if the three premises of the small-improvement argument hold
for hard cases, as argued for by Chang9, Boot10 and others, then people vio-
late transitivity when being confronted with such choices. We have recently
tested people’s response proﬁles to two hard cases of comparison and found
that a slight majority of the participants indeed failed to reason transitively.11
Nonetheless, these results seem to call for further investigation for at least
two reasons: (i) A substantial minority (around 40% of the tested subjects)
did not violate the transitivity condition, which requires a more elaborate
explanation. (ii) Only a speciﬁc subset of hard cases were presented to parti-
cipants, namely, scenarios that involve important decisions. However, a wide
range of examples of putative hard cases of comparison have been proposed
in the philosophical literature, e.g. choosing between tea and coﬀee, going to
one event or the other, deciding between a career as a lawyer and a career as
a musician.12
9 Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112 (2002)
10Martijn Boot, ’Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justiﬁed Choice’, Philosophical
Studies 146 (2009)
11Michael Messerli & Kevin Reuter, ’Hard Cases of Comparison’, Philosophical Studies
(2016), 10.1007/s11098-016-0796-y. Psychologists have conducted several experiments
to show that people do not always have transitive preferences (e.g. Alfred Tversky,
’Intransitivity of preferences’, Psychological Review 76 (1969), pp. 31-48. Peter Fishburn,
’Nontransitive preferences in decision theory’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4 (1991),
pp. 113-134. Graham Loomes & Caron Taylor, ’Non-Transitive Preferences Over Gains
and Losses’, The Economic Journal 102 (1992), pp. 357-365. Tversky for instance, argues
that in a speciﬁc context like a multidimensional decision situation, people do violate so
called weak probabilistic transitivity, i.e. people prefer x to y and y to z with a likelihood
greater than 50% but do not prefer x to z in more than 50% of times. In this article, we
do not adress the classic transitivity requirement, but cases of negative transitivity (see
section 2.1). As far as we know, there is no empirical research so far, showing that people
violate negative transitivity. We plan to extend our research to investigate violations of
negative transitivity in probabilistic settings.
12Chrisoula Andreou, ’Choosing Well: Value Pluralism and Patterns of Choice’, in T.
Brooks (Ed.), New Waves in Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 48-63.
Martijn Boot, Incommensurability, Incomplete Comparability and the Scales of Justice.
Dissertation (University of Oxford, 2007). Ruth Chang, ’The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics
112 (2002). Ruth Chang, ’Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’, Philosophical
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These and other decisions diﬀer massively in the importance they have for
people’s lives. An alternative explanation of violations of transitive reasoning
considers the interplay between hard choices and the importance these choices
have for people’s lives. Thus, people may well reason intransitively only when
a hard choice is important.
But how can we understand the distinction between an important and an
unimportant decision? An important decision has far reaching consequences.
It enables and disables a whole series of other possibilities. Choosing bet-
ween a career as a lawyer and a career as an artist, for example, is rather
important because becoming a lawyer will foreclose many opportunities that
an artist will be oﬀered (and vice versa). In contrast, a consumption choice
in a restaurant is rather unimportant because it does not enable and disable
a host of other possibilities. People simply have a cup of coﬀee and, in most
circumstances, move on with their lives in the same way as if they had taken
a cup of tea. In other words, the costs of correcting an important decision are
much higher than an unimportant one. Becoming aware that studying law
is not quite the right thing to do in one’s life, is a very costly realization. In
this paper, we will therefore put a particular focus on how the degree of im-
portance might matter for the claims that have been put forward about hard
cases, i.e. they manifest (i) failure of transitivity, and (ii) inappropriateness
of choosing randomly.
Both putative characteristics of hard cases of comparison will be critically
examined in this essay. To do so, we conducted six empirical studies. The re-
sults of the experiments we present in this paper show that: (a) If the decision
process lacks importance, a substantial majority of the participants do not
violate transitivity. Only if the decision is important, a slight majority fails
the transitivity requirement. (b) The perceived inappropriateness of selecting
randomly does not seem to be a characteristic that can be used to single out
hard cases of comparison. When comparing the percentages of people who
are willing to “let the coin decide“, no diﬀerences were found between hard
cases and those in which both options were considered equally good.
The paper will proceed as follows: In Section 2 we investigate whether
people violate transitivity in a set of hard choices. Section 3 addresses the
question of whether rejecting random selection is a successful test to identify
hard cases. Section 4 concludes with a General Discussion. The Appendix
presents the vignettes of the empirical studies.
Issues 22 (2012). Raz, The Morality of Freedom.
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2 Is Transitivity Violated in Hard Cases?
2.1 Theoretical Background
While there does not exist a consensus among philosophers on how to inter-
pret hard cases, it is generally accepted that they characteristically involve a
failure of transitivity. To see why, consider the following argument involving
the premises of the small-improvement argument (SIA):
i. Failure of transitivity is constitutive of the premises of the SIA.
ii. The premises of the SIA underly hard cases of comparison.
∴ Failure of transitivity underlies hard cases of comparison.
In the introduction we have discussed the choice between a career as a
lawyer and a career as an artist as an example of the SIA. In order to see
more clearly how failure of transitivity is constitutive of the premises of the
SIA, let us formalize the premises of the SIA:
1 ¬(x ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x) premise
2 ¬(x+ ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x+) premise
3 x+ ≻ x premise
’x’, ’y’ and ’x+’ stand for the options in decision-making situations.13
The formalized premises of the SIA violate the following kind of transitivity:
(x+ ≻ x ∧ ¬(y ≻ x))→ x+ ≻ y
Thus, if people endorse all three premises of the SIA, they reason intran-
sitively.
It is important to notice that the transitivity under consideration is not
of the form such as x is better than y, y is better than z, thus x is better
than z. Instead, the transitivity is logically equivalent with following negative
transitivity principle:14
¬(x+ ≻ y) ∧ ¬(y ≻ x))→ ¬(x+ ≻ x)
13Read ’≻’ as ’is better than’. Read ’≺’ as ’is worse than’. Read ’=’ as ’equally good’.
14For example, Douglas Bridges & Ghanshyam Metha, Representations of Preferences
Orderings (Berlin: Springer, 2013) reﬂect on negative transitivity.
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While the ﬁrst premise (i) of the argument stated above is therefore logi-
cally true, the second premise (ii) seems to allow for empirical falsiﬁcation.
It states that all three premises of the SIA are endorsed in hard cases of
comparison. Several philosophers have argued for the truth of premise (ii).
Chang, for instance argues that the SIA holds for all kinds of hard cases, such
as a choice between a cup of tea and a cup of coﬀee or a choice between two
careers.15Thus, in all these cases an agent makes the following judgments:
(1) x is neither better nor worse than y, (2) x+ is neither better nor worse
than y, (3) x+ is better than x. Given the argument stated above, Chang
commits herself to the view that in all these hard choices an agent violates
transitivity. A similar position is held by Boot.16
Some philosophers might not agree that (ii) is an empirical premise but is
rather part of the deﬁnition of what it is for a choice to be hard. Accordingly,
if a person does not also endorse premise (3) of the SIA then the choice she
faces is not hard for her. We disagree with this conception of a hard case
for reasons that will become manifest during the course of this paper. We
will, however, take up this issue in the General Discussion when we present
several arguments in favor of the claim that failure of transitive reasoning is
not constitutive of hard cases of comparison.
How do we propose to separate hard choices from choices that are not
hard? Hard choices seem to be diﬀerent from choices in which options are
considered equally good – hereafter simple cases – in that a small-incentive
does not make any diﬀerence in the decision process. Thus, for those people
who endorse premise (1) and premise (2) of the SIA, the choice seems to be
hard, because not only is neither option better or worse than the other, it is
also the case that an improved option is not considered better than the other
option. In contrast, when the original options are considered neither better
nor worse, but a small improvement makes a diﬀerence in the perception of
the options, then the original options seem to have been considered of equal
value, which we call simple cases.
So, do people really violate transitivity in hard cases? While it seems
intuitively correct to say that people prefer a slightly improved option (x+)
compared to an unimproved choice (x), empirical evidence has not yet been
collected in support of this intuition. Study 1A and 1B were designed to test
15Ruth Chang, Making Comparisons Count (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 126.
16Martijn Boot, ’Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justiﬁed Choice’, Philosophical
Studies 146 (2009), at p. 89.
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people’s response patterns in hard cases to examine whether people indeed
reason intransitively.
2.2 Study 1A
Methods
In order to investigate (a) whether people violate transitivity in hard ca-
ses of comparison, and (b) how the importance of the decision inﬂuences
people’s responses in these cases, we selected three cases of varying import-
ance: (a) a low importance decision between two drinks; a choice of medium
importance between two events; and a high importance decision between two
courses of study. 151 participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
cases. All participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
and reimbursed for their participation. The ’Study scenario’ read as follows
(all vignettes are attached in the Appendix):
Some people think that studying art is neither better nor worse than studying law.
Others believe that studying philosophy is neither better nor worse than studying econo-
mics.
Imagine you have got the choice only between studying two diﬀerent courses. Please
name two courses for which YOU could not tell which one of those is better or worse than
the other for studying.
Participants then had to write down two courses of study which they
thought fulﬁlled the condition of being neither better nor worse. At the next
stage, we identiﬁed those participants for whom a small-improvement would
not make any diﬀerence in the decision process. All those participants who
chose a slightly improved option (x+) over (y), would indicate that they
considered the two original options (x) and (y) to be equally good. The
other participants seemed to be indeed faced with a hard case of comparison.
In order to compare the three cases, we used an incentive that had the same
relative value for all three decisions – a 5% discount on one of the options.
Thus, the second vignette presented to the participants read:
Now, imagine that the university tells you that you will get a discount of 5% on the
costs of one of these courses of study. Keeping in mind the two courses you selected before,
how would you evaluate your situation?
• The course plus a small discount is better than the other course without a discount.
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• The course plus a small discount is worse than the other course without a discount.
• The course plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the other course
without a discount.
In all three scenarios (drink choice, event choice, study choice) we also as-
ked the participants a third question, designed to investigate whether people
indeed violate transitivity in hard cases of comparison:
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the course of study for which
you were oﬀered a 5% discount and the very same course without getting the discount.
How would you evaluate your situation?
• The course plus a small discount is better than the very same course without a
discount.
• The course plus a small discount is worse than the very same course without a
discount.
• The course plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the very same
course without a discount.
Again, the participants were requested to assent to one of the three pro-
positions above.
Results
We started the survey asking people to name two drinks, two events, or
two courses for which they could not decide which one of them is better
or worse than the other. In the second vignette, we oﬀered a 5% discount
to one of the two options. 38% of the participants in the drink case, 37%
of the participants in the event case, and 51% of the participants in the
study case, indicated that this was a hard choice by selecting the ’neither
better nor worse’ option. The third question investigated the transitivity
requirement. Of the 21 participants for whom the drink choice was a hard
case, 6 participants decided that the improved option (x+) was better than
(x), whereas 15 decided that neither option was better than the other. A
similar result obtained in the event choice with 3 out of 14 participants
opting for the ’better’ option and 11 participants for the ’neither better nor
worse option’. Only in the study case did a majority believe that (x+) was
better (17 participants out of 29) than (x) compared to 12 participants who
thought (x+) was neither better nor worse than (x). The percentages of all
three experiments are shown in Figure 1. No participant in any of the three
cases thought that (x+) was worse than (x).
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Figure 1 Response percentages to the third question (testing for violations of transitivity) comparing a
slighly improved option (x+) with the original option (x). We excluded the ’worse’ option in this figure,
because it was not selected by any of the participants.
We conducted Pearson’s Chi Square tests to investigate whether data
from any of the three experiments yielded signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the
50% mark – only taking into account ’better’ and ’neither better nor worse’
responses. None of the tests were signiﬁcant. Drink Case: χ2 =2.12, p = 0.145;
Event Case: χ2 =2.49, p = 0.115; Study Case: χ2 = 0.43, p = 0.510. We
then compared the scenarios with each other using conservative Bonferroni
correction. Both the Drink case and the Event Case diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from the Study Case: χ2 =4.43, p = 0.035 (Drink vs. Study) & χ2 =5.25, p
= 0.022 (Event vs. Study), supporting the view that the importance of the
decision had an eﬀect on the transitivity question.17
17In order to control for a possible order eﬀect on the transitivity question, we conducted
a study in which we asked 103 participants a single question about whether a slightly
improved option (x+) is considered better, worse, or neither better nor worse than an
unimproved option (x). The participants were randomly assigned to the drink choice,
event choice, or study choice. In all three cases, an overwhelming majority considered
option (x+) to be better than option (x): 85.3% in the Drink case, 91.1% in the Event
case, and 88.6% in the Study case. The percentages of the responses were in all three
cases signiﬁcantly diﬀerent compared to the responses in the original study: Drink Case:
χ2 =18.05, p < 0.001; Event Case: χ2 = 25.83, p < 0.001; Study Case: χ2= 8.03, p =
0.005. This demonstrates that the context in which the decision is made has a particularly
strong inﬂuence on people’s choices (see Discussion 2.4. for further elaboration of this
point).
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2.3 Study 1B
Methods
Study 1A indicates that a majority of people violate transitivity in hard
choices only if the decision is suﬃciently important. However, this conclusion
can be challenged: the three scenarios not only vary in terms of importance,
but vary on a host of other dimensions, e.g. factual uncertainty, kind of
activity, amount of money, length of time spent doing the activity, etc. In
order to focus more narrowly on the importance of the decision, we designed
a second study in which the vignettes are not only more easily comparable
but in which we also only varied one factor. The vignettes read:
Scenario 1
Some people think that living in Australia is neither better nor worse than living in
Sweden. Others believe that living in Switzerland is neither better nor worse than living
in Ireland. Imagine you have got the choice between spending the next year / next 25
years living in one of two diﬀerent countries. Please name two countries (other than the
United States) for which YOU could not tell which one of those is better or worse than
the other to live in.
People were prompted to name two countries, Country A and Country B,
which would then play a signiﬁcant role in the decision processes in Scenario
2 and Scenario 3.
Scenario 2
Now, imagine you have got the choice between spending the next year / next 25
years either living in country A plus receiving an extra dollar per week or living in country
B and not receiving an extra dollar per week. How would you evaluate your situation?
• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is better than living in country B for one year / 25 years.
• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is worse than living in country B for one year / 25 years.
• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is neither better nor worse than living in country B for one year / 25 years.
Scenario 3
Now, imagine you have got the choice between spending the next year / next 25
years either living in country A plus receiving an extra dollar per week or living in the
same country A and not receiving an extra dollar per week. How would you evaluate your
situation?
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• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is better than living in country A for one year / 25 years.
• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is worse than living in country A for one year / 25 years.
• Living in country A for one year / 25 years plus receiving an extra dollar per week
is neither better nor worse than living in country A for one year / 25 years.
As can be seen from the three scenarios, we only varied information about
the length of the stay abroad, i.e. whether the person would spend one year
or 25 years in a diﬀerent country. Obviously, a decision as to stay one year
abroad is much less important than a stay for 25 years.
Results
161 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and
randomly assigned to either the one year condition (N = 83) or the 25 years
condition (N = 78). Of the 83 participants in the one year condition, 39
subjects selected ’neither better nor worse’ when a small incentive, i.e. an
extra dollar per week, was added to the ﬁrst option, thereby indicating that
the choice was indeed hard for them. 13 out of the 39 participants (33%) vio-
lated the transitivity condition by selecting the option ’better’ in the third
scenario when comparing x+ with x. 67% (26 participants) did not violate
transitivity. In the 25 years condition, 42 participants selected ’neither bet-
ter nor worse’ when a small incentive was added. A greater percentage, i.e.
52% (N = 22) of the participants failed the transitivity condition whereas
48% selected ’neither better nor worse’. A Pearson’s Chi Square test revea-
led a marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the “unimportant“ and the
“important“ condition: χ2 =2.99, p = 0.084.
2.4 Discussion
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of Study 1A and Study
1B. First, when people deliberate on hard choices, e.g. between going to a
concert or attending a sports game, it does not follow automatically that
people violate a crucial transitivity requirement that has been singled out
as a characteristic of hard cases of comparison. In two (drink choice, event
choice) out of three cases in Study 1A, a majority of the participants did not
prefer an improved option (x+) over the original (x) when having previously
declared not to favor either (x) over (y), and (x+) over (y). Similarly, in
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Study 1B, a majority of the participants who were confronted with a choice
between going to one of two countries for one year, failed to violate the
transitivity condition.
Second, the importance of the scenarios seemed to play an important
role in people’s reasoning. In the study case, a majority violated transitivity
by favoring a discounted course of study compared to the non-discounted
course. Diﬀerences between the study case and the other two cases turned
out to be signiﬁcant. As we have mentioned above, it might be objected that
the diﬀerences between the study case and the other two scenarios should
not be explained by the importance of the decision but was rather due to
other possible factors that were varied in Study 1A.18 In order to address
this objection we conducted Study 1B in which only the time of stay in
one of two countries was varied. In the more important decision (25 years) a
greater number of participants violated transitivity than in the less important
condition (one year). One might respond that it was rather the length of
time that mattered in people’s decision process not so much the importance
attached. However, we cannot see any plausible reason why people should
reveal diﬀerent response patterns given the length of time independently of
the importance attached to it.
Third, people’s responses to the transitivity question were highly context-
dependent. An overwhelming majority prefered an improved option (x+) over
the original one (x) when asked independently of a hard case (see footnote 5).
However, if people were confronted with a hard choice involving a decision
between (x+) and (x), then most people did not seem to prefer (x+) at
least when the decision was not very important. In the General Discussion
we discuss how the results of Study 1A and Study 1B can be explained
given that they seem to contradict the widely held claim about failure of
transitivity as a mark of hard cases.
18We would like to thank a reviewer of this journal for stimulating a discussion on this
issue.
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3 Do people reject the toss of a coin in hard
cases?
3.1 Theoretical Background
If you are confronted with a choice between two equally appealing law ﬁrms
that only diﬀer in regards to their names, or with a choice between two coo-
kies of the same type, ﬂipping a coin seems to be an adequate strategy.19
Do people ﬁnd it equally appropriate to toss a coin in a hard case? Or is it
characteristic of a hard case, in contrast to a case in which both options are
considered equally good, that a random choice is perceived to be inappro-
priate? Some philosophers have claimed that in hard cases of comparison, we
do not ﬁnd it appropriate to toss a coin in order to arrive at a decision. E.g.,
Schaber (1994) writes:
“In a choice between two exactly equally valuable options, we
would be willing without hesitation, to toss a coin. This does not
apply to two options which are roughly equal. We do consider it
inappropriate to toss a coin in such a situation.“20
Schaber’s suggestion is interesting and, perhaps, prima facie plausible.
However, he does not provide any independent evidence for his proposal
but seems to rely solely on his own intuitions about easy and hard cases of
comparison. Other philosophers have voiced similar claims, e.g. Chang states:
19One could also say that picking is an adequate strategy. Chang for instance writes:
“When the alternatives are equally good, you pick rather than choose because the rea-
sons don’t favor one option over the other but give you license to select arbitrarily.“ (Ruth
Chang, ’Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’, Philosophical Issues 22 (2012), at
p. 117.) Where options are equal, it is not worhwhile to go through the process of choo-
sing. Picking makes perfect sense (see Edna Ulmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser,
’Picking and Choosing’, Social Research 44 (1977), pp. 757-785). There is a diﬀerence
between picking an option and using a stochastic process, such as tossing a coin. Uncon-
scious biases may inﬂuence how we pick one option over the other. However, for sake of
simplicity let us regard both picking and ﬂipping a coin as a random choice.
20The German original reads: „Bei zwei genau gleich wertvollen Optionen wären wir ohne
zu zögern bereit, eine Münze zu werfen. Das triﬀt auf ungefähr gleich wertvolle Optionen
nicht zu. Bei solchen Optionen halten wir das Werfen einer Münze für unangemessen.“
(Peter Schaber, ’Sind alle Werte vergleichbar? Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse und das Inkom-
mensurabilitätsproblem’, Analyse und Kritik, 16 (1994), at p. 158).
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“The resolution of perplexity in hard cases is different in nature.
Suppose Jack puts the ordered pair (philosophical career x, legal
career y) in the ’better than with respect to goodness as a career’
pile. Whether the pair is to be sorted in this way is not, however,
a matter of arbitrary stipulation, a coin flip cannot appropriately
determine how the case is to be resolved.“21
It should be noted that whereas Schaber focuses on the descriptive ques-
tion of whether people ﬁnd it inappropriate and hence whether people will
toss a coin in hard cases, Chang, instead, makes a normative claim about the
inappropriateness of using a coin toss, i.e. she asks whether people should
toss a coin in hard cases. Chang’s main argument for why she believes a
coin toss is hardly ever an appropriate way to determine the right choice in
a hard case, is a psychological one. She maintains that an agent needs to
commit herself to her decision in hard cases.: “Commitments are by their
nature willings of some kind.“22 Accordingly, making a commitment means
“willing something to be a reason“23, whereby she explains this as follows:
“Willing something to be a reason is the activity of placing your will – your
very agency – behind its being a reason.“24 In other words, decisions in hard
cases should be based on reasons but not on random selection, e.g. a coin
toss:
“Far from being cases in which you must abandon your rational
agency, hard choices arguably present opportunities for exercising
our rational capacities to their fullest. In thinking about which
career to pursue, you might marshal all your cognitive and non-
cognitive resources to settle on an alternative that best expresses
who you are as a rational agent.“25
21Chang, The Possibility of Parity, p. 138.
22Ruth Chang, ’Commitment, Reasons, and the Will’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8
(2013), pp. 74-113, at p. 92.
23Ruth Chang, ’Commitment, Reasons, and the Will’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8
(2013), at p. 93.
24Ruth Chang, ’Commitment, Reasons, and the Will’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8
(2013), at p. 93.
25Ruth Chang, ’Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’, Philosophical Issues 22
(2012), at p. 118.
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Following Chang, we have pyschological reasons to reject a random selec-
tion in hard cases of comparison. Other philosophers have put forward the
claim that it is rational to randomize in hard cases. E.g., Peterson argues
that an agent should decide randomly in hard choices.26 The idea is that an
agent who does not ﬂip a coin will be exploited in a modiﬁed money pump
situation.27
So, what is the ’empirical reality’? Do people really reject a random pro-
cedure to arrive at a decision in hard cases? More speciﬁcally, are there any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between hard choices and easy choices in terms of whe-
ther or not people think it appropriate to toss a coin? Does it matter whether
the choice is important? In order to investigate these questions, we designed
two experiments that would allow us to determine whether coin tossing is
considered an inappropriate means to arrive at a decision in hard cases of
comparison.
3.2 Study 2A
Methods
We used the same vignettes as in Study 1A, i.e. 146 participants were
randomly assigned to either the drink case, the event case, or the study case.
We ﬁrst asked the participants to name two drinks (respectively, two events
or two courses) for which they could not tell that one of the two options
was better or worse than the other. We then presented participants with the
small-improvement choice to separate those people who considered the choice
to be hard from those who thought of the options as being of equal value
(see Appendix for the exact wording of the vignettes).
The third and last vignette, did not, however, ask the transitivity ques-
tion, but instead prompted the participants to state whether in the original
choice, ﬂipping a coin would be an appropriate means to arrive at a decision.
The vignette in the Study case read:
26Martin Peterson, The Dimensions of Consequentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013)
27Let us brieﬂy illustrate Peterson’s point: Suppose an agent chooses y instead of x+, and
x instead of y. Then the agent will pay a small amount of money to move from x to
x+. If we play this game ad inﬁnitum, the agent loses all his / her money. In contrast,
an agent who decides randomly will not be exploited (Peterson, The Dimensions of
Consequentialism, p. 129).
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In the beginning, we asked you to imagine two courses of study for which you could
not tell which one of those courses is better or worse than the other. Would ﬂipping a coin
be an appropriate way to decide in favor of one of the options?
• Yes
• No
All participants were recruited on Mechanical Turk and compensated for
their participation.
Results
Based on the participants’ responses to the second question, we divided
the participants into two groups. Those for whom the options were a hard case
of comparison, i.e., those who chose ’neither better nor worse’ when a small
discount was oﬀered to one of the two options, and those participants for
whom a small improvement made a diﬀerence, i.e., those who chose ’better’
when a small discount was oﬀered. As mentioned before, we will call this the
’simple case’. Table 1 lists the absolute numbers as well as the percentages
of participants that opted in favor of tossing a coin.
Absolute numbers Percentages
Simple Case Hard Case Simple Case Hard Case
Drink Scenario 21 (out of 33) 11 (out of 21) 64% 53%
Event Scenario 18 (out of 24) 11 (out of 14) 75% 79%
Study Scenario 14 (out of 25) 15 (out of 29) 56% 52%
Table 1: Positive answers to the ’tossing a coin’ - question in absolute and relative numbers.
Pearson’s χ2 tests were carried out for all three scenarios to compare
the numbers between the hard case and the simple case. None of the three
scenarios yielded any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two types of cases:
Drink Scenario (χ2 = 0.67, p=0.412); Event Scenario ( χ2= 0.06, p=0.803);
Study Scenario (χ2= 0.10, p=0.754).
3.3 Study 2B
Methods
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While the results of Study 2A suggest that the importance of a hard
choice might inﬂuence whether people consider it inappropriate to toss a
coin in making a decision, the data do not provide us with a clear picture.
Furthermore, we already argued that various confounds can be identiﬁed that
might have skewed the results. We therefore follow the same strategy as with
the transitivity studies, and used the vignettes of Study 1B to test whether
the importance of a decision matters for how appropriate people ﬁnd it to
toss a coin. The only diﬀerence between the two cases consisted in the length
of the time that people would spend in either of two countries. We presented
the same participants of Study 1B with the following vignette:
In the beginning we asked you to imagine a choice between living in country A for
one year / 25 years or in country B. Would ﬂipping a coin be an appropriate way to
decide in favor of one of the options?
People then had a simple choice between Yes and No.
Results
Of the 83 participants who were assigned to the less important decision
of choosing to spend one year abroad, 62 participants (74.7%) considered it
appropriate to toss a coin as a means to make a decision. In contrast, only 39
out of 78 participants found a coin toss appropriate in the more important
decision on where to spend the next 25 years. A χ2 test revealed that this
diﬀerence was highly signiﬁcant: χ2 = 10.41, p=0.001.
3.4 Discussion
The empirical studies that we carried out to investigate the inappropriateness
condition as a characteristic feature of hard cases, delivered a clear verdict:
Study 2A demonstrates that people seem to be just as willing to opt in favor
of tossing a coin in hard cases as they are in situations in which they consider
the choice to be simple. Study 2B shows that whether or not the use of a
random procedure is considered appropriate partially depends on whether
the choice is important or not.
Objection 1
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It might be objected that the participants in our study did not understand
what it means to ﬂip a coin. In order to ensure that the participants were
aware of the consequences of ﬂipping a coin, we asked them to explain their
decision in Study 2A. The responses strongly suggest a proper understanding
of the appropriateness of the coin toss. Explanations did not diﬀer between
those participants for whom the choice was hard and those for which the
choice was simple.
Examples of typical explanations in favor of coin tossing in hard cases:
“Since there is no better option, randomly choosing would suffi-
ce.“, “Both fields are incredibly valuable to study; as such, I could
not pick which one to take by myself without some random gene-
ration involved.“
Examples of explanations in favor of coin tossing when options are seen
as a simple choice.
“If you cannot decide which is better or worse, flipping a coin is a
neutral way to decide which to take“, “Because its the exact same
odds as me just picking one.“
Similarly, when the participants rejected such a coin toss, they seemed to
understand the process clearly:
Examples of explanations against coin tossing in hard cases:
“Courses decide your future, you really can’t be leaving to luck“,
“Can’t leave a major decision to random chance.“
Examples of explanations against coin tossing when options were not seen
as a hard choice:
“Randomly selecting your education is never a wise choice.“, “I
would rather take the course that I feel like I would do better at.“
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Objection 2
A more serious objection challenges the correctness of the order of the
diﬀerent vignettes that we presented to the participants. Note that after
prompting participants for options that they considered neither better nor
worse, we did not immediately ask them about the rationale of a coin ﬂip but
rather presented them with the vignette in which one option was slightly im-
proved. Thus, if the questions about ﬂipping a coin had been asked straight
after the ﬁrst vignette, results might have been diﬀerent. To test the possi-
bility of an order eﬀect, we therefore repeated Study 2A with one important
diﬀerence. This time, we reversed the second vignette and the third vignette,
such that the participants ﬁrst answered whether a coin ﬂip is appropriate
and then had to face a choice between (x+) and (y). The results show no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two types of cases. Thus, the experiment
provides further support that indeed people ﬁnd coin tossing as appropriate
in hard cases of comparison as in simple cases.28
4 General Discussion
In a series of experiments, we investigated two claims. First, it has been
argued that transitivity is violated in hard cases of comparison. Second, it
has been claimed that people ﬁnd it inappropriate in hard choices to make
a decision in favor of one of the two options based on a random procedure.
In making these claims, philosophers have primarily relied on their own in-
tuitions. However, expert intuitions may not reﬂect the behavior of people
when they are in fact confronted with decisions in hard cases of compari-
son. Even though the results of the experiments raise serious worries for the
claims that have been made by philosophers based on their intuitions, we
cannot conclude from these results that those intuitions are mistaken. To
put expert intuitions to the test, experiments need to be set up that put
participants in situations in which they face a hard choice and in which their
decisions have a direct impact on their future lives, e.g. by indeed getting a
cup of coﬀee but no tea.29 Instead, we asked laypeople to reﬂect on how they
28Using Pearson’s χ2 test, we compared the results between the hard case condition and
the simple case condition for all three scenarios. None of the tests yielded a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two conditions (Drink: χ2 = 0.74, p=0.388, Event: χ2 = 0.66,
p=0.416, Study: χ2 = 0.01, p=0.916).
29Note, that unimportant hard choices, like deciding between two drinks, can easily be
realized in an experimental setting. Confronting participants with important hard choices
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themselves would have behaved in hard cases of comparison. Thus, despite
the results we report in this paper, it might still be the case that the experts’
intuitions are correct. However, while we do not believe that asking people
about their preferences in hard cases will necessarily match their behavi-
or precisely, collecting responses about people’s preferences are much more
likely to map their behavior than the intuitions of experts. Several empiri-
cal studies have shown high consistency between people’s stated preferences
and their revealed preferences when it comes to e.g., vaccination behavior30,
consumers’ choices31 and family planning32.
Given that asking people about their own preferences in hard choices is
a much more promising way to get at people’s true behavior than relying on
expert intuitions about other people’s preferences, how do both claims fare
in light of the empirical results we presented in this paper?
4.1 Inappropriateness of Coin Tossing
One of the claims under investigation was that using a random procedure is
deemed inappropriate in hard choices. The results strongly suggest that this
claim is mistaken. In all three scenarios of study 2A we found that a majority
of the participants did not feel it would be inappropriate to toss a coin in
order to arrive at a decision in a hard case of comparison. One might remark
that many more people will use a coin toss or any other random means in easy
cases of comparison, e.g. when deciding between two yoghurts of the same
type or between two careers at two equally appealing companies. While we
have not tested people’s responses in these cases, we do not doubt that in
easy cases more people will be happy to toss a coin or throw a dice. However,
the claim under investigation was not that slightly fewer people would feel
that it would be inappropriate to toss a coin but rather that most people
would do so. However, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found when comparing
in an experimental setting, is extremely diﬃcult both from a ﬁnancial as well as from
an ethical point of view.
30Mattijs Lambooij et al., ’Consistency between stated and revealed preferences: a discrete
choice experiment and a behavioural experiment on vaccination behaviour compared’,
BMC Medical Research Methodology 15 (2015), pp. 1-8.
31Maria Loureiro, & Jill McCluskey & Ron Mittelhammer, ’Are Stated Preferences Good
Predictors of Market Behavior?’, Land Economics 79 (2003), pp. 44-55.
32Indralal De Silva, ’Consistency Between Reproductive Preferences and Behavior: The
Sri Lankan Experience’, Studies in Family Planning 22 (1991), pp. 188-197.
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the numbers between those who considered either of the three cases hard,
and those that did not.
While the results presented in this paper seem to directly contradict Scha-
ber’s descriptive position, what is the bearing of these results on the normati-
ve position advocated by Chang? Obviously, we cannot derive the normative
claim that it is appropriate to toss a coin in hard cases from the descripti-
ve claim that we think it is appropriate. However, we believe Chang should
provide an explanation as to why a majority of people hold an apparently
mistaken picture about the appropriateness of tossing a coin. Chang will pre-
sumably consider the situation as one in which the reasons for why people
should not toss a coin in hard cases are not transparent to them, i.e. there
are reasons for rejecting a coin toss in hard cases, but many people have not
yet reﬂected on them. The most plausible argument in favour of Chang’s po-
sition can be constructed from her writings33 on people’s commitments and
the need to identify themselves with their decisions. This argument has the
following form:
a. People need to identify with their decisions in hard cases.34
b. If people need to identify with their decisions in hard cases, then it
is inappropriate to toss a coin in order to arrive at a decision in hard
cases.
∴ It is inappropriate to toss a coin in order to arrive at a decision in hard
cases.
Let us look in greater detail into the plausibility of the ﬁrst premise:
When it comes to identifying oneself with a decision, the more crucial
factor might well lie in the importance of the decision for a person but not
in whether the decision is hard or simple. Especially Study 2B suggests that
fewer people are willing to toss a coin in important cases. Thus, when being
confronted with a decision that has relatively little impact on people’s future
lives, most people do not seem to feel an urgency to identify with their
33See Ruth Chang, ’Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?’, Philosophical Issues
22 (2012) and Ruth Chang, ’Transformative Choices’, Res Philosophica 92 (2015), pp.
237-282.
34This premise is not meant to specify a moral obligation to identify with a decision in
hard cases, but merely claims that there is a certain psychological need for such an
identiﬁcation.
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decision even though the choice is hard. In contrast, a decision as to whether
a person should study law or philosophy, or a decision where to spend the
next 25 years, will partially determine how that person’s personality will be
shaped. Therefore, there might be a much greater need to put one’s agency
behind important decisions. Hence, the need to identify with one’s decision
seems to apply more strongly to important decisions regardless of whether
the choice is hard or simple.
4.2 Failure of Transitivity
A very prominent role in debates on hard cases is also taken by the claim that
people violate transitivity when facing hard choices. The results we presen-
ted in Section 2, however, show that in less important hard cases, a majority
of the participants failed to violate transitivity by not prefering a slight-
ly improved option (x+) over the original option (x). What at ﬁrst glance
appears very unusual – Why should people not choose the better option?
– can be given a sensible interpretation by drawing on Hsieh’s concept of
clumpiness.Nien-Hê Hsieh, ’Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability’, Uti-
litas 17 (2005), pp. 180-204. According to Hsieh’s view, we often compare
items using a so called covering consideration (a decision criterion) that is
clumpy, i.e. we sort items into clumps depending on how well they fulﬁl the
relevant respects that comprise a certain criterion. ’Goodness as an undergra-
duate student article’ for instance, is a clumpy decision criterion: We might
have exam papers worth an ’A’, exam papers worth a ’B’ and so on, where-
by these clumps “(...) reﬂect the smallest units of measurement for purpose
of comparison.“35 How exhaustive these clumps are depends on the purpose
of the comparison. Thus, another grading system with a more ﬁne-grained
resolution may function in terms of ’A+’ exam papers ’A’ exam papers ’A-’
exam papers etc. The important point made here is that two options can be
equally good according to one and not equally good according to another
comparison, or as Andreou puts it: “In Hsieh’s view, two options O1 and O2,
and two resolutions R1 and R2, can be such that A is better than B when
resolution R1 is in play and A is equal (not just roughly equal) to B when
resolution R2 is in play.“36
35Nien-Hê Hsieh, ’Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability’, Utilitas 17 (2005), at p. 198.
36Chrisoula Andreou, ’Parity, Comparability, and Choice’, The Journal of Philosophy CXII
(2015), pp. 5-22, at p. 15.
23
Applying these theoretical considerations to our problem at hand, one
might argue that given the resolution of the comparison people have in
mind, the incentive (’+’) is not relevant to the comparison. Thus, we be-
lieve a promising explanation of the results can be provided by analyzing the
importance the incentive played in people’s decision process: Those partici-
pants who considered the decision to be hard, were not persuaded by a small
incentive to prefer the improved option (x+) over (y). This suggests, that
the amount of the incentive was insuﬃcient to “escape“ the clump that was
deﬁned by the original options. It is now likely that the perception of the
incentive as insuﬃcient carried over from the second question to the third
question (transitivity question). Thus, although the incentive “should“ ha-
ve played a pivotal role in the transitivity question, people seemed to have
thought in the same categories or clumps, and have maintained the same
attitude towards the incentive in both scenarios: Thus, they did not prefer
the improved option.
However, whereas in the drink and event case around 75% of the partici-
pants did not violate transitivity, only 40% failed to violate transitivity in the
study case. Thus, the carry-over eﬀect did not dominate people’s responses
in the hard choice scenario that had the greatest importance for the decision
maker. Any comprehensive explanation should account for these diﬀerences.
The following explanation seems to be forthcoming: The incentive of a 5%
discount was chosen in order to ensure that all three cases remain comparable.
However, the absolute value of the incentive diﬀers between all three cases.
While in the drink and event case, the absolute value of the incentive amounts
to a few dollars, in the study case, the absolute value can easily reach a few
hundred or even thousand dollars. Hence, awareness of the absolute value may
have counteracted the perception of the incentive as insuﬃcient – at least to
a certain extent. An initial reaction to chose “neither better nor worse“ in
the study case may be overridden by a secondary reasoning process to the
eﬀect that a lot of money would be saved if the discounted study course were
chosen.
If this explanation is along the right lines, then it would be premature
to dismiss people’s responses as a mere bias which do not reﬂect the real
preferences of the participants. Instead, people’s preferences seem to change
in hard cases of comparison such that the transitivity requirement is not
violated.
Before we conclude, let us consider one last objection, to which we have
already alluded in Section 2, against the results we obtained in regards to the
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transitivity claim. Some philosophers deﬁne hard choices as cases in which
one option is neither better, nor worse, nor equally good than the other. We
have argued above that in order to logically conclude that both options are
not equally good, people need to violate the transitivity condition. Thus, it
might be argued that whether or not people violate transitivity in hard cases
is not an empirical matter but rather deﬁnitional. Accordingly, our experi-
ments do not show that people do not fail the transitivity condition in hard
cases, the results instead reveal that these cases are simply not hard cases
of comparison. However, this response seems unconvincing. First, restricting
hard cases in the way suggested would mean that many decisions are hard
only for a tiny fraction of the population. Most cases that have been cited
and discussed in the literature would not be real-world cases but rather ﬁc-
titious hard cases of comparison. Second, this move would only lead to a
verbal dispute. Choices in which people do not believe one of the options
to be better or worse even if an incentive is added, continue to exist and
represent fascinating objects of research. Not calling them “hard cases“ only
changes them in name but does not change their philosophical attraction.
Thus, future research should leave open the possibility that in many hard
cases of comparison people do not violate transitivity.37
5 Conclusion
Hard cases raise fundamental questions for rational choice. For the last thir-
ty years, philosophers have discussed hard cases of comparison in rational
decision-making processes. The philosophical consensus states that hard ca-
ses can be characterized by intransitive reasoning and the perceivced inap-
propriateness of using a random process to make a decision. Both claims are
ﬁrst and foremost supported by the intuitive plausibility of exemplary cases,
i.e. philosophers have relied on their own intuitions to evaluate the truthful-
ness of these claims. We have therefore started to investigate the two claims
empirically. Our results lead us to disagree with the philosophical consen-
sus in two important respects: First, rejecting a random procedure is not
a characteristic of a hard case. People ﬁnd it appropriate to toss a coin in
order to arrive at a decision. Second, failure of transitivity seems to be an
37Whether this means that hard cases should rather be identiﬁed purely based on the ﬁrst
two premises of the small-improvement argument, as we have suggested in this paper, is
a question for future research.
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integral part of hard choices only insofar as the decision is an important one.
Unimportant hard cases cannot be characterized as constituting intransitive
reasoning.38
38Department of Philosophy, Laenggassstrasse 49a Bern, 3000 Switzerland (ke-
vin.reuter@philo.unibe.ch). Department of Philosophy, 45 Victoria Street, Shef-
ﬁeld, S37QB UK (michael.messerli@philo.unibe.ch).This work is fully collaborati-
ve. Please address any correspondence to kevin.reuter@philo.unibe.ch and micha-
el.messerli@philo.unibe.ch. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this jour-
nal for extensive comments on the paper, as well as the audiences at conferences in Bern,
Düsseldorf and Reading where this work was presented. Michael Messerli was supported
by the SNF Postdoc Mobility Grant P2SKP1_171776.
26
Appendix: Vignettes of Study 1A and Study
2A
Study 1A
First Vignette
Drink Choice 1
Some people think that a cup of tea is neither better nor worse than a cup of
coﬀee. Others believe that a Gin & Tonic is neither better nor worse than a Bloody
Mary. Imagine you are sitting in a café which only has two diﬀerent drinks on the
menu. Please name two drinks for which YOU could not tell which one of those is
better or worse than the other.
• First drink:. . .
• Second drink:. . .
Event Choice 1
Some people think that a Bryan Adams concert is neither better nor worse
than attending the Super Bowl. Others believe that going to a Broadway musical
is neither better nor worse than seeing the Chinese National Circus. Imagine it is
Saturday night, and you have got the choice only between two cultural or sports
events. Please name two events for which YOU could not tell which one of those
is better or worse than the other.
• First Event:. . .
• Second Event:. . .
Career Choice 1
Some people think that studying art is neither better nor worse than studying
law. Others believe that studying philosophy is neither better nor worse than
studying economics. Imagine you have got the choice only between studying two
diﬀerent courses. Please name two courses for which YOU could not tell which one
of those is better or worse than the other for studying.
• First course:. . .
• Second course:. . .
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Second Vignette
Drink Choice 2
Now, imagine that the waiter tells you that you will get a discount of 5% on
one of these drinks. Keeping in mind the two drinks you selected before, how would
you evaluate your situation?
• The drink plus a small discount is better than the other drink without a
discount.
• The drink plus a small discount is worse than the other drink without a
discount.
• The drink plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the
other drink without a discount.
Event Choice 2
Now, imagine that the ticket salesperson tells you that you will get a discount
of 5% on one of these events. Keeping in mind the two events you selected before,
how would you evaluate your situation?
• The event plus a small discount is better than the other event without a
discount.
• The event plus a small discount is worse than the other event without a
discount.
• The event plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the
other event without a discount.
Career Choice 2
Now, imagine that the university tells you that you will get a discount of 5%
on the costs of one of these courses of study. Keeping in mind the two courses you
selected before, how would you evaluate your situation?
• The course plus a small discount is better than the other course without a
discount.
• The course plus a small discount is worse than the other course without a
discount.
• The course plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the
other course without a discount.
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Third Vignette
Drink Choice 3
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the drink for which you
were oﬀered a 5% discount or the very same drink without getting the discount.
How would you evaluate your situation?
• The drink plus a small discount is better than the very same drink without
a discount.
• The drink plus a small discount is worse than the very same drink without
a discount.
• The drink plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the very
same drink without a discount.
Event Choice 3
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the event for which you
were oﬀered a 5% discount or the very same event without getting the discount.
How would you evaluate your situation?
• The event plus a small discount is better than the very same event without
a discount.
• The event plus a small discount is worse than the very same event without
a discount.
• The event plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the very
same event without a discount.
Career Choice 3
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the course of study for
which you were oﬀered a 5% discount or the very same course without getting the
discount.
How would you evaluate your situation?
• The course plus a small discount is better than the very same course without
a discount.
• The course plus a small discount is worse than the very same course without
a discount.
• The course plus a small discount is neither better nor worse than the
very same course without a discount.
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Study 2A
The ﬁrst two vignettes were identical to Study 1. We therefore only list the
third vignette of Study 2.
Drink Choice 3
In the beginning, we asked you to imagine two drinks for which you could not
tell which one of those drinks is better or worse than the other.
Would ﬂipping a coin be an appropriate way to decide in favor of one of the
options?
• Yes
• No
Please brieﬂy explain your answer:. . .
Event Choice 3
In the beginning, we asked you to imagine two events for which you could not
tell which one of those events is better or worse than the other.
Would ﬂipping a coin be an appropriate way to decide in favor of one of the
options?
• Yes
• No
Please brieﬂy explain your answer:. . .
Study Choice 3
In the beginning, we asked you to imagine two courses of study for which you
could not tell which one of those courses is better or worse than the other.
Would ﬂipping a coin be an appropriate way to decide in favor of one of the
options?
• Yes
• No
Please brieﬂy explain your answer:. . .
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